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ISSUES ON APPEAL IN VIEW OF STATE'S RESPONSE 
1. Whether a law must use the word classification in order to create one. 
2. Whether a thought coupled with an act, no matter how insignificant that act, can still create a 
crime. 
3. Whether fundamental fairness is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The state contends in its response that the defendant cannot challenge a criminal statute under 
the Equal Protection clause because they do not create classifications. Obviously that is incorrect; 
the very defining of the crime creates a classification which can be compared to similarly situated 
individuals, something courts in this state have been doing since at least 1909. See, e.g., State v. 
Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 51 (Ct.App.2003); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397,401 (Ct.App.1999); 
State v. Rountree, 129 Idaho 146, 151 (Ct.App.1996); Ex Parle ~Mallon, 16 Idaho 737, 102 P. 374, 
377 (1909). 
The state goes on to argue that the uniqueness ofldaho's definition of burglary has no effect 
upon its constitutionality, an odd argument since were the opposite true the state would undoubtedly 
have pointed out every state that has a similar definition. Then the state claims that the defendant 
never stated the standard of review. While it is not clear what purpose that claim was intended to 
serve, the defendant did include the standard on page ten, within a block quote from Ex Parte 
Mallon. 
As the state's entire response consisted of these baseless claims and no actual argument as to 
why Idaho's felony burglary statute differentiates between thieves that steal out-of-doors and those 
that choose to go inside a structure or how that differentiation rationally relates to a legitimate 
government purpose as applied to this case, it appears the state could not come up with a rationale 
that would satisfy the standard. 
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IL 
state on to that Idaho's burglary statute is not Speech 
because it does not include speech. See State's Brief at 7. However, one paragraph later the 
state recognizes that "speech" is not necessary as part of the statute since the challenge is being 
brought under a theory that the crime as defined is thought crime and chills protected speech. 
Despite this recognition, the state then argues that confessions do not mean that the First Amendment 
comes into play. Since the defendant had not argued any of this, no reply is warranted. 
On page eight of its brief the state finally begins to develop arguments in favor of the 
burglary statute as applied by arguing that the statute does require an act However, the state then 
argues that any act will do: 
Further, that Rome does not think the act - entry into a defined space - is a 
"substantial step toward anything," is irrelevant 
State's Brief at 8. Unfortunately the state does not go on to explain, but taken as written, it appears 
that from the state's point of view, criminal liability can attach so long as a thought is combined with 
any action. Wake up in the morning intending to go shoplifting can be a crime. Driving to work in 
the morning with impure thoughts about your neighbor's spouse can be a crime. So long as an act is 
named in the statute for pairing with a thought, a crime has been committed. This is of course an 
Orwellian nightmare in the making, and this Court should reject the state's arguments as flagrant 
violations of the First Amendment See US v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 714 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
The state then spends a paragraph discussing the holdings in Balsys, Robinson, and 
Morissette. Had the state gone to the citation provided in Balsys, it would have understood why the 
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u-..d.vu,,.., cited the dissenting opinion. Robinson and ,Morissette each deal with the importance of 
an actus reus and a mens rea a crime, and while they were not as 
Amendment challenges, that does not mean that the First Amendment is not an appropriate vehicle 
for review since in modern times courts have been using a First Amendment analysis. See US. v. 
Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 182-83 (2nd Cir.2011) (Raggi, J., concurring in part); US v. Tykarsky, 446 
F.3d 458 (3rd. Cir.2006); Jackson v. Thurmer, 748 F.Supp.2d 990, 995 (W.D.Wis.2010); US v. 
Kaechele, 466 F.Supp.2d 868 (E.D.Mich.2006). 
Finally the state makes the argument that "for the purpose of' is not meaningfully different 
from "with intent to." Even if that were correct, which it obviously is not, the holding in Tykarsky is 
that: 
By requiring that the interstate travel be "for the purpose of' engaging in illicit sexual 
activity, Congress has narrowed the scope of the law to exclude mere preparation, 
thought or fantasy; the statute only applies when the travel is a necessary step in the 
commission of a crime. 
446 F.3d at 471. "With intent to" cannot be said to delineate a necessary step in the commission of 
theft. It is purely circumstantial. As the District Court noted, it essentially allows a person to intend 
theft upon arriving in the parking lot, change their mind, and then change it again after entering to 
avoid liability. Tr. p. 18, L. 19-25. 
III. 
The state argues that the defendant's Due Process theory has no basis in State v. Saviers, 156 
Idaho 324, 326 (Ct.App.2014) because the words "Due Process" never appear. That argument is 
specious, in that the state must know that fundamental fairness is a due process requirement, which is 
precisely what the Court held in Saviers in the reason for the general rule. Id., State v. Lewis, 144 
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Idaho 64, 66 (2007) ("The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that criminal 
prosecutions comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness."). As the Supreme Court 
noted in Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., NC., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981 ): 
For all its consequence, "due process" has never been, and perhaps can never be, 
precisely defined. "[U)nlike some legal rules," this Court has said, due process "is 
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances." Cafeteria Workers v. lvfcElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895 (1961). Rather, the 
phrase expresses the requirement of "fundamental fairness," a requirement whose 
meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process 
Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what "fundamental 
fairness" consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant 
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake. 
Thus, the state's argument that the defense pulled Due Process into this case from nowhere is 
disingenuous. Clearly, the Court of Appeals held in Saviers that Due Process was the reason 
for the general rule. 
However, the defense has some sympathy for the state's half-hearted defense of the 
general rule as created in State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341 (Ct.App.1986). The state notes in a 
footnote on page 13 of its brief that the general rule clearly cannot claim to have come from 
the text of the statute itself. However, as the defense went to great lengths to illustrate in its 
brief, the general rule is clearly based in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution. That 
the opinions dealing with the rule have been sometimes conflicting is something the defense 
is aware of and has already commented on. This Court should find that rule is based upon 
concerns for notice and fairness, as required by Due Process. Thus, in this case, the Court 
should find that the defendant's priors as presented by the state at trial must be considered 
one conviction pursuant to the general rule. 
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